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By Danielle Bongiovanni
I INTRODUCTION
In January 2026, the Supreme Court of Victoria considered what it means for a prisoner to be in the open air. At issue was the scope of the right conferred by section 47(1)(a) of the Corrections Act 1986 (Vic), which entitles prisoners to a minimum of one hour in the open air each day, weather permitting. In Marrogi v Secretary, Department of Justice and Community Safety & Ors (No 1),[1] Harris J drew on Irish High Court authority to construe in the open air as requiring genuine exposure to the outdoors, including the capacity to see the sky and feel the sun or rain on one’s face.[2]
Whether that standard is satisfied is not determined by a bright-line rule, but by an evaluative assessment of fact and degree.[3] Relevant considerations include exposure to prevailing weather; the sense of being outdoors and exposed to the elements; outlook to open space or vegetation; and the space available for movement and exercise.[4] An exercise yard will not satisfy the standard if, in substance, it is little more than a cell without a roof.[5] Compliance with section 47(1)(a)[6] therefore turns on the lived conditions of confinement.
The State, however, moved quickly to circumvent that baseline. The Corrections Amendment Bill 2026 (Vic) (Bill), introduced in June 2026, inserts new section 47AAA into the Corrections Act, making open air access subject to operational considerations including staffing, management, security and safety whenever compliance is not reasonably practicable.[7] The Bill also retrospectively extinguishes liability for past non-compliance and insulates the amended provision from ordinary Charter scrutiny[8] despite the Government conceding that the resulting limitations on Charter[9]rights cannot be justified under section 7(2).[10]
This article argues that the Bill subverts Marrogi’s[11]clear judicial baseline by collapsing the boundary between statutory rights and administrative discretion. By integrating operational constraints into the threshold condition governing the right’s operation, the Bill achieves a form of legislative capture that allows the State to determine the scope of its own duties. When an institution is empowered to define the reach of its own obligations, the statutory floor loses its protective function: the right no longer constrains institutional power; institutional power constrains the right.
II THE JUDICIAL BASELINE
The conflict over institutional power therefore concerns the conditions, if any, upon which a statutory minimum may yield to administrative discretion. In Marrogi,[12] Harris J anchored section 47(1)(a)[13] in prisoner welfare, recognising open air access as essential to physical and mental health and as a reprieve from prolonged cell confinement.[14] The entitlement operates as a statutory minimum, irrespective of prisoner conduct: for example, although contraband had been discovered in the applicant’s cell, Harris J held that fact irrelevant to the State’s obligations under section 47(1)(a).[15] Open air access cannot therefore be conditioned on behaviour or withheld as an administrative sanction.[16] While incarceration permits lawful restrictions on liberty, it does not extinguish statutory rights or render their observance contingent on the discretion of prison management.[17]
Harris J’s evaluative approach left no room for administrative convenience to substitute for compliance. What mattered was the physical and sensory reality of the open space, not the operational difficulty of providing alternatives.[18] The State therefore retains discretion over how to manage high-risk prisoners, but not over what satisfies the statutory minimum.[19]
The Bill disrupts that distinction. The Government contends that managing high-risk cohorts endangers staff, necessitates lockdowns, and restricts access to communal infrastructure,[20] such that daily open air access cannot always be provided consistently with prison security.[21] The Bill responds by making those operational constraints relevant to whether the statutory minimum must be observed at all.
The question then becomes not whether institutional safety matters, but whether such considerations operate as a justification for limiting a statutory right or as a condition governing whether that right must be observed at all.
III LEGISLATIVE CAPTURE
The Bill answers that question through structural relocation. While leaving Harris J’s substantive definition of in the open air untouched, it relocates where operational considerations sit within the architecture governing that right. Ordinarily, such considerations arise at the justification stage, where the State must demonstrate under section 7(2) of the Charter[22] that interference with a right is reasonable and demonstrably justified.[23]
Instead, new section 47AAA[24] embeds those operational constraints within the entitlement itself, transforming considerations such as prison security from reasons for limiting the right into conditions governing whether the right must be provided at all.[25] This is legislative capture: the right remains textually intact, but its operation is redrawn to absorb the very considerations that would ordinarily require justification.
This relocation alters the nature of the right. There is a fundamental difference between a right from which security concerns may justify temporary departure, and one whose operation depends on whether compliance is reasonably practicable.[26] The former preserves an independent legal standard against which State action must be justified; the latter incorporates the reasons for departure into the conditions governing the right itself.
The distinction matters because prisons themselves control the very operational conditions against which practicability is assessed. Marrogi[27] reveals the significance of that control. Communal yards capable of satisfying section 47(1)(a)[28] existed at Barwon, yet Corrections Victoria preferred individual rear yards because they reduced the need to escort and handcuff prisoners to communal open air spaces.[29] Those yards were small, layered enclosures of brick, steel mesh and Perspex, adjoining enclosed staff walkways and sally ports, and illuminated by fluorescent lighting 24 hours a day.[30] The Court found that the rear yards produced a strong sense of enclosure,[31] and did not satisfy section 47(1)(a).[32] Marrogi[33]therefore exposes the central difficulty with making statutory compliance contingent on operational practicability: where a compliant alternative exists, institutional convenience may nevertheless favour the arrangement that restricts the right.
Where institutional arrangements are treated as fixed constraints, the right must adapt to the prison rather than the prison to the right. By making compliance contingent on factors within the State’s own control, the Bill makes institutional capacity the measure of the statutory obligation: the less capable the system is of delivering the right, the weaker the right becomes.
IV SHIFTING THE COST OF NON-COMPLIANCE
Under the ordinary operation of the Charter,[34] any limitation on a right must be demonstrably justified pursuant to section 7(2).[35] Any override requirement must be re-enacted every five years in accordance with section 31(7),[36] a mechanism compelling the Government to periodically re-justify the limitation rather than making it permanent. The Bill systematically departs from this protective framework in three ways: it excludes section 47AAA from section 7(2) justification despite the Minister’s own finding that the limitation on a prisoner’s rights to humane treatment could not be justified;[37] disables the section 31(7) re-enactment requirement so that exclusion operates in perpetuity;[38] and, through the Bill’s new section 111AA, retrospectively extinguishes compensation for the very breach the Bill declines to justify.[39]
Accordingly, the Bill severs accountability between State non-compliance and legal consequence. By making future entitlements subject to what is reasonably practicability[40] and barring remedies for past unlawful confinement, including in proceedings already on foot,[41] it insulates the State from legal recourse without eliminating the consequences of non-compliance.
Instead, those consequences are transferred to prisoners, who remain confined in substandard conditions while being stripped of the legal mechanisms available to compel change or seek redress. Fiscal responsibility is a legitimate legislative objective, but a rule of law concern arises when Parliament responds to a judicial finding of statutory non-compliance by retrospectively extinguishing the legal consequences of the breach.
This legal deficit also exposes tension with Victoria’s Treaty[42] framework. The Government acknowledges that First Nations people are significantly overrepresented within Victorian prisons, particularly among separated cohorts,[43] and accepts systemic racism drives this disparity.[44] First Nations prisoners are therefore disproportionately exposed to the discretion the Bill expands. A facially neutral conferral of discretion cannot operate neutrally where exposure to that discretion is itself structurally unequal. The Minister’s own assessment reinforces that concern, finding the Bill in part incompatible with the Treaty’s[45] object of addressing the unacceptable disadvantage inflicted on First Peoples by the historic wrongs and ongoing injustices of colonisation.[46]
The State’s manoeuvre to bypass the Charter’s section 7(2)[47] scrutiny altogether[48] exposes a deeper structural problem: proportionality cannot constrain legislative power where Parliament can relocate the limitation beyond the reach of proportionality itself. The ultimate question is therefore not how the Court balances competing interests in a single case, but whose institutional judgment determines the architecture of the right and which communities bear the consequences when its protection is weakened.
V CONCLUSION
The Bill fundamentally alters the relationship between human rights and State authority by allowing operational constraints to determine the reach of a statutory right.[49] Acute safety risks may justify temporary, scrutinised restrictions on a prisoner’s right to be in the open air.[50] But the legal position changes when those risks become conditions of the right itself rather than reasons for its limitation. Where Marrogi[51] required Corrections Victoria to measure its practices against an independent legal standard,[52] the Bill reverses that relationship by making the statutory minimum contingent on the institution’s own operational conditions.[53]
The consequence extends beyond open air access. A statutory right that operates only where the institution bound by it considers compliance reasonably practicable[54] ceases to function as an independent constraint on State power. Once the institution’s own considerations determine the reach of its legal obligations, the statutory guarantee becomes contingent on the authority it was enacted to constrain. The right no longer constrains institutional power; institutional power determines the reach of the right.
[1] [2026] VSC 4, (Marrogi).
[2] Ibid, [90] (Harris J), citing Whelan v Governor of Mountjoy Prison [2015] IEHC 273.
[3] Ibid, [70], [86], [100] (Harris J).
[4] Ibid, [70] (Harris J).
[5] Ibid, [52]; Andrew Coyle and Helen Fair, A Human Rights Approach to Prison Management: Handbook for Prison Staff, (Institute for Criminal Policy Research at Birbeck, University of London, 3rd ed, 2018) 47.
[6] Corrections Act 1986 (Vic).
[7] Corrections Amendment Bill 2026 (Vic), (The Bill), inserting s 47AAA into the Corrections Act 1986; Victoria, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 18 June 2026, 2589–90 (Paul Hamer MP, Member for Box Hill), (Parliamentary Debates).
[8] Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic), (The Charter).
[9] Ibid.
[10] Ibid.
[11] Marrogi (n 1).
[12] Ibid.
[13] Corrections Act (n 6).
[14] Marrogi, [66] (Harris J).
[15] Ibid (n 1), [14], [17]-[18] (Harris J).
[16] Ibid.
[17] Ibid, [64]-[66] (Harris J).; Castles v Secretary, Department of Justice [2010] VSC 310, [185]-[186] (Emerton J).
[18] Marrogi, [70], [73]-[113] (Harris J).
[19] Ibid, [86]-[113] (Harris J).
[20] Parliamentary Debates (n 6), 2581 (Paul Hamer).
[21] Ibid.
[22] Charter (n 8).
[23] Ibid.
[24] The Bill (n 7).
[25] The Bill (n 7), inserting s 47AAA into the Corrections Act 1986 (Vic); Parliamentary Debates (n 7), 2589-90 (Paul Hamer).
[26] Ibid.
[27] Marrogi (n 1).
[28] Corrections Act (n 6).
[29] Marrogi, [38] (Harris J).
[30] Ibid, [93]-[95], [99]-[101] (Harris J).
[31] Ibid (n 1), [96], [102] (Harris J).
[32] Ibid, [103]; Corrections Act (n 6).
[33] Ibid.
[34] Charter (n 8).
[35] Ibid.
[36] Ibid.
[37] The Bill (n7),s 47AAA; The Charter, s 7(2); Parliamentary Debates (n 7), 2581 (Paul Hamer).
[38] Ibid; The Charter, s 31(7); Ibid.
[39] The Bill, s 111AA; Parliamentary Debates, 2578–9, 2581 (Paul Hamer).
[40] The Bill (n 7), s 47(1)(a)(i).
[41] Ibid s 111AA; Parliamentary Debates (n 7), 2578 (Paul Hamer), noting the provision applies to any proceedings that are on foot and have not been finally determined before the Bill commences.
[42] Statewide Treaty Act 2025 (Vic), (Victorian Treaty).
[43] Parliamentary Debates, 2585, 2589 (Paul Hamer) (Statement of Treaty Compatibility).
[44] Ibid.
[45] Victorian Treaty.
[46] Ibid s 66(3)(d)(ii); Parliamentary Debates (n 7), 2586 (Paul Hamer) (Statement of Treaty Compatibility).
[47] The Charter (n 8).
[48] The Bill (n 7), inserting 47AAA into the Corrections Act 1986 (Vic); Parliamentary Debates (n 7), 2581 (Paul Hamer).
[49] Ibid.
[50] Charter (n 8), s 7(2).
[51] Marrogi (n 1),
[52] Ibid, [63]-[70], [86]-[113] (Harris J).
[53] The Bill, inserting s 47AAA into the Corrections Act 1986; Parliamentary Debates, 2589-90 (Paul Hamer).
[54] Ibid.